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ABSTRACT
Apocalyptic groups have launched attacks in the past, which if
competently executed, would have been catastrophic. The security
community needs a greater understanding of when law enforcement
or the military should intercept dangerous apocalyptic groups. This
comparative case analysis explores the length of time apocalyptic groups
remain in existence, and when, during their life-span, they cross the
threshold to catastrophic violence. The apocalyptic groups examined in
this paper are centrally focused on the expectation of end-times or they
seek to catalyze its arrival in ways that offend laws or social norms
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INTRODUCTION
Apocalyptic movements are security threats because they are prone
to seek catastrophic effects on society.1 A greater understanding of
when to interdict these groups is important because they have launched
attacks in the past, which if competently executed, would have been
catastrophic.2 Failure to understand the developmental trajectory of these
groups creates a reactionary orientation to them and leaves security to
chance that these groups will not be competent in the future to execute a
catastrophic attack. A better understanding of apocalyptic group life span
is necessary to decide when to engage these groups.
Engaging apocalyptic groups can be fraught with peril because these
groups have a readiness to see law enforcement intervention as fulfillment
of their prophecies.3 The apocalyptic believer may see law enforcement
intervention as fulfillment of apocalyptic expectations and reason for
all-out resistance or the execution of latent terrorist plans. Understanding
apocalyptic group life span will provide perspective on when and how
to approach these groups. Further delineation in this regard is necessary
because these groups do not represent a uniform typology. Apocalyptic
groups can be inwardly destructive instead of outwardly destructive, or
they may have a defensive orientation rather than an offensive orientation
as they await their apocalyptic moment in time.
The purpose of this comparative case analysis is to explore the length of
time apocalyptic groups remain in existence, and when, during their life
span, they cross the threshold to catastrophic violence. This study defines
apocalyptic group life span as extending from the group’s inception
(the year the group emerged) to its end (the year the group dissolved).
Hypotheses generated from the cases can inform the conceptualization of
apocalyptic groups and their proclivity to launch catastrophic attacks. The
research questions ask, “What is the typical life-span of an apocalyptic
group?” and “When is the best time for the security community to
interdict these groups before they attempt a catastrophic attack?”
The scope of this study is broad. Apocalyptic groups, also known as
millenarian groups, can range from benign to lethal. The term apocalyptic
refers to what will happen at the end of time, which is usually some
catastrophe, such as a large war or a natural disaster.4 The term
millenarianism refers to what is to come after—and as a function of—the
apocalypse, which is a time of perpetual peace and resolution of perennial
difficulties.5 Groups with an apocalyptic worldview include religious sects,
cults, and terrorist organizations. This study does not consider those
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1653
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world religions that observe end times eschatology to be apocalyptic.
Rather, apocalyptic groups examined in this article focus centrally on
the expectation of end-times or seek to catalyze its arrival in ways that
offend laws or social norms. This may include sects or splinter groups of
the major world religions, but the world religions have messages beyond
apocalyptic thinking, and are not examined in this study.
The hypotheses generated from this study have implications throughout
the security community. Military and intelligence stakeholders can
benefit from this article, as can various levels of law enforcement. Military
and intelligence stakeholders will likely discover the results useful if
planning to engage an organization with an apocalyptic worldview.
A contemporary example is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
which is a militant apocalyptic group.6 Understanding the developmental
trajectories of apocalyptic groups may offer insight into early warnings
and indications, which could provide the upper hand in anticipating an
attack.

WHY STUDY APOCALYPTIC GROUPS?
The rationale for this study is based on the observation that many
apocalyptic groups are not rational actors amenable to deterrence
strategies.7 This observation reflects a rational choice model, which
posits that rational actors seek to maximize personal utility net of cost.8
Apocalyptic groups, according to this model, are likely to be unresponsive
to the typical levers of power because they actively anticipate a
catastrophic confrontation where their net loss is unsustainable. Greater
understanding of these groups is therefore needed to anticipate their
behavior. It is a faulty assumption to presume these groups would not
unleash a mass casualty attack because it would alienate them from some
constituency. Apocalyptic groups are not necessarily bound to a social
constituency, so they may not operate according to the same set of
constraints that impinge upon terrorists who have political ambitions.
The difficulty al-Qaeda core had in controlling Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) illustrates the dialectic between terrorist groups
with a strategic agenda and those with an apocalyptic ideology. Zarqawi
was reluctant to swear allegiance to al-Qaeda, and after he did, al-Qaeda
leadership frequently scorned him for taking actions, such as targeting
Shiites, in furtherance of his apocalyptic vision rather than remaining
in close consort with al-Qaeda core’s strategic mission.9 Zarqawi’s
steadfastness in maintaining true to his apocalyptic ideology despite
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it drawing the scorn of al-Qaeda leadership illustrates the importance
of understanding apocalyptic thinking within the context of terrorist
organizations. As AQI demonstrated, terrorist groups with an apocalyptic
vision can act as jihadist free riders who partake in the jihadist global
insurgency but who will act in furtherance of their apocalyptic vision
irrespective of any larger, coordinated jihadist strategy.
Apocalyptic group research has a gap in the literature that overlooks
the life span of these organizations. Though scholars have noted that
these groups do not fit into a rational-actor model and that the whim of
a charismatic leader often drives them, there is a dearth of literature on
what these groups look like from their inception to their end.10 There is no
clear delineation of critical milestones in the development of these groups
that may forewarn of catastrophic action. Failure to understand when
and why apocalyptic groups take action led to Aum Shinrikyo launching
chemical and biological attacks across Japan in the 1990’s without
warning. The only reason these attacks did not produce mass casualties
was because of Aum Shinrikyo’s incompetence in these endeavors.11 Aum
Shinrikyo was unable to effectively procure, prepare, package, or deploy
the botulinum toxin, anthrax, Q fever, Ebola, nuclear explosives, and sarin
with their intended effects, though the group made persistent attempts.
Interestingly, Aum Shinrikyo’s early failures in these endeavors did not
decisively hone the attention of Japanese authorities, which could have
interdicted the group before it launched its 1995 sarin attack.12
A greater understanding of apocalyptic groups is particularly important
now when globalization is likely to influence millenarian beliefs as cultures
continue to collide and face fundamental changes or extinction.13 The
potential therefore exists that more apocalyptic groups may emerge in
the future. Furthermore, greater understanding of apocalyptic group
behavior is relevant to the current terrorist threat from the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Islamic State is an apocalyptic group that
has already shown that it is not averse to committing mass atrocities.14
The rapid dissolution of the ISIS caliphate in the Middle East will leave
the group desperate for a dramatic impact, so understanding the
group’s behavior as it relates to its apocalyptic mindset may help avert a
catastrophic attack in the future.

APOCALYPTIC CONTEXT
Apocalyptic and millenarian movements have occurred throughout
history. These movements occur outside the context of cults or terrorist
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1653
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organizations as well as within them.15 Apocalyptic thinking is found in
cultures, societies, or groups that experience oppressive conditions or
social decay.16 Oppressed groups, such as the colonized Incan civilization
of the sixteenth century and the indigent members of People’s Temple
of the twentieth century, may look to apocalyptic visions for hope, while
those that experience social decay may look to apocalyptic visions for a
corrective solution to seemingly permanent immoral behavior. The need
for an absolute end to a hopeless state of affairs and a corresponding
renewal sets the stage for the anticipated cosmic war that is common to
apocalyptic movements. The cosmic war motif describes an epic, divinely
authorized battle between good and evil in a world gone awry.17 This motif
is identifiable in the way diverse groups of apocalyptic terrorists view the
world, including Sikhs in India, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, Kach in Israel, and
Islamic groups in the Middle East.18
Apocalyptic terrorism gained greater attention in the 1990’s.19 The
distinction between this type of terrorism and the more traditional
terrorism was becoming clearer as the new millennium approached. The
greatest distinction seemed to lie in the desire of apocalyptically inspired
terrorists to destroy the existing order and to engage in indiscriminate
killing to do so. These new terrorists were increasingly dangerous because
the sociopolitical restraints that kept the old terrorists in check no longer
applied.20 These new terrorists were only accountable to their deity, so the
amount of carnage they could theoretically inflict was difficult to estimate
but extensive if they were to acquire WMD. Despite the apprehension
caused by the emergence of apocalyptic inspired terrorists at the end of
the twentieth century, this sort of terrorist was still considered to be in the
minority and their threat was even considered to be overstated by serious
thinkers in the field.21
Cults that hold apocalyptic beliefs can also be dangerous because they
see the world in dichotomous terms, their judgment is blinded, and,
to them, the law is relative.22 Apocalyptic cults form the basis of their
worldviews by distorting the writings found in the major religions or
other systems of belief. For example, People’s Temple and the Branch
Davidians distorted the Christian religion, while Heaven’s Gate based its
actions on belief in UFO’s. Cults with an apocalyptic vision, and terrorist
groups for that matter, have a greater proclivity for violence when led by
a charismatic-millenarian leader.23
Cults, or New Religious Movements (NRM), tend to synthesize different
religious and philosophical traditions to create their own atmosphere of
community, belief, and emotional gratification.24 The proliferation of cults
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is the result of cultural integration, transformation, and globalization.25
Cults offer psychological and social rewards for people with vulnerabilities
in psychosocial areas who are left confused by the disorganization
created by a rapidly changing society.26 The potential for violence exists
with cults when the cult leadership or vision is questionable.

CASES
Peoples Temple
Jim Jones founded People’s Temple in 1956 with a group of 20 followers.27
Jones was a charismatic leader who engaged in physical, sexual, and
psychological abuse of his followers. After ongoing media scrutiny, Jones
moved his group to Guyana where People’s Temple owned land. In April
of 1978, a group of “Concerned Relatives” officially accused Jim Jones
of human rights violations.28 In November 1978, US Congressman Leo
Ryan arrived at Jonestown with members of the media and Concerned
Relatives to investigate his constituency’s claims about the cult. The
delegation publicly questioned Jones, and some cult members chose to
defect and leave with the delegation. On November 18, 1978, members of
People’s Temple attacked the delegation at the airstrip as it was leaving
Guyana, which resulted in five dead and twelve wounded. Later that day,
Jim Jones ordered his group to drink poisoned cool-aid, resulting in the
death of 909 people.
Branch Davidians
The Davidians were an offshoot of the Seventh Day Adventist religious
sect, but the Davidians’ beliefs significantly deviated from their parent
group throughout the cult’s existence, and even more after Koresh
assumed leadership of the group. The sect experienced fragmentation
until 1978, at which time the cult most closely resembled the Branch
Davidians that Koresh eventually took over. On February 28, 1993, Alcohol
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents deployed to the Branch Davidian
compound in Waco, Texas, to arrest Koresh on weapons and explosives
charges.29 A standoff immediately ensued. During negotiations, Koresh
became uncooperative and preached excessively to the negotiators and
claimed to have special knowledge of the apocalypse.30 On April 19, 1993,
a lethal fire erupted in the compound. Arson investigations concluded
that the fire began in the inside at multiple points of origin with flame
accelerants applied to instigate the fire.
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Solar Temple
Luc Jouret and Joseph Di Mambro founded the Order of the Solar Temple,
or Solar Temple, in 1986.31 Characterizations of Solar Temple describe
a cult that was a syncretic mixture of religion, esoteric traditions, and
paranormal beliefs.32 Jouret proclaimed that the end of the world was
approaching and only the part of Quebec, Canada, where his group was
located would survive. On October 4, 1994, Di Mambro had a defector, the
defector’s wife, and their infant son killed in an eccentric stabbing ritual.
Twelve hours later, investigators found twenty-two people in Switzerland
in a burning house—nineteen of whom had a gunshot wound to the head—
and arranged in a star-like ceremonial formation while wearing Solar
Temple garb. Hours later elsewhere in Switzerland investigators found
twenty-five bodies dead from injection of poison. All the adults were part
of the Solar Temple, including Di Mambro and Jouret. Five of the dead
were children. In December 1995, investigators discovered sixteen people
in a similar ceremonial lying of bodies with gunshot wounds and set on
fire. In March 22, 1997, investigators found five more people burned in a
Solar Temple ritual.
Aum Shinrikyo
Aum Shinrikyo began in Japan in 1984 as a fifteen-member meditation
group.33 The guru of the group and its founder was the charismatic Shoko
Asahara. Aum Shinrikyo began receiving unfavorable media coverage
as it progressed, and an Aum Shinrikyo Victim’s Society emerged.
Asahara’s paranoia increased with the activities of the Victim’s Society,
which prompted him to order members to kill the Victim Society’s
attorney, Tsutsumi Sakamoto. On November 4, 1989, group members
killed Sakamoto, but they also killed his wife and child. Asahara continued
to expand Aum Shinrikyo and sent candidates from the group to seek
national election in the Japanese government, but they decisively lost at
the polls.34 After this defeat, Asahara became overtly apocalyptic in his
thinking. Asahara believed that he had to “liberate” the people by killing
them or using poison as a societal purgative.
Aum Shinrikyo began its weapons development and procurement
activities in 1990. At this time, the group attempted to deploy
the botulinum toxin by driving a vehicle and spraying the toxin
indiscriminately.35 In 1992, Aum Shinrikyo members traveled to Zaire to
obtain a culture of the Ebola virus. In 1993, Aum Shinrikyo used a crude
pumping system to deploy the anthrax toxin from the roof of one of its
buildings with little success. At around this time, Aum Shinrikyo solicited
Russian sources for nuclear and chemical weapons, while also searching
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for radioactive material in various locations. Some believe that a Russian
weapons expert gave the group a blueprint for sarin.36 Aum Shinrikyo
continued its attacks on opponents during this time and in 1994 released
sarin near judges who presided over a land dispute case to which Aum
was a party. Seven people died because of this attack and hundreds
sustained injuries. On March 20, 1995, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin in a
Tokyo, Japan, and subway killing thirteen and injuring hundreds of people.
Surprisingly, Aum Shinrikyo received many protections under Japanese
law because of its religious classification so the Japanese government
did not purposely disband Aum Shinrikyo even after its subway attack.
In 2000, Aum Shinrikyo changed its name to Aleph and underwent a
significant transformation of its mission and vision. The organization
known as Aleph is no longer recognizable as Aum Shinrikyo because of
the significant changes.
Heaven’s Gate
Bonnie Nettles and Marshall Applewhite founded Heaven’s Gate in 1975.37
Their ideology was a syncretic version of Revelation theology and UFO
folklore. Defections occurred within their following as their predictions
failed to materialize. The rebuke of their prophetic ability prompted the
group to move into seclusion in Wyoming. The group lived in seclusion
for sixteen years, and in 1991 resurfaced when it produced a video
series on humans and UFO’s. In 1993, the group purchased ad space in
major newspapers and local and alternative periodicals to disseminate
the group’s message. In 1994, the group made several talks around the
United States about the importance of joining Heaven’s Gate to ensure a
proper “exiting.” The group went back into seclusion in 1995 and did not
have any media attention until March 1997. Starting on March 23, 1997,
and ending on March 26, 1997, the group committed mass suicide by
consuming barbiturates with alcohol and asphyxiating themselves. The
group committed suicide in waves such that the wave to follow the group
before would clean up after the deceased members and arrange them in
a ceremonial manner. The group believed that it was departing earth for
a different level of existence. Thirty-nine people died at the end of the
group’s mass suicide.
Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments
The Movement for the Restoration for the Ten Commandments began in
1989 by a few ex-communicated Catholic Church priests and nuns. The
group’s main belief was to restore the Ten Commandments to its original
prominence. Joseph Kibwetere was the chief visionary of the group and
promulgated visions he stated were from heaven. P. M. Venter examined
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1653
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the events surrounding the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten
Commandments’ implosion that resulted in mass murder-suicide.38 The
group believed that the world would end on December 31, 1999, and at
such time all people on earth would perish, while the group members
would transport to heaven. When the end of the world did not occur
on December 31 as predicted, Kibwetere changed the date to March 17,
2000. Venter believes that group members began to question Kibwetere
when his prediction did not occur, and they requested their money and
possessions back and their release from the group. Days before March 17,
2000, the group murdered eight would-be secessionists by blunt trauma
and poison and dumped their bodies in a mass grave. Their challenge to
the group leader’s fragile psyche appeared to be a major precipitant to
Kibwetere’s tragic decision for the group. On March 17, 2000, the group
entered their church, which already had its windows boarded from the
outside. Once inside, the members locked the doors and a catastrophic
explosion occurred that destroyed the church and its members.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 from the
terrorist network he led since 2000. Zarqawi reluctantly swore allegiance
to bin Laden and formed AQI. Zarqawi’s group was a major force in the
Iraq insurgency and quickly gained notoriety from both coalition forces
and Muslims in Iraq. Zarqawi’s ideology led him to vehemently target
Shiites and generally have little concern about killing other Muslims in his
attacks. Zarqawi’s ideology was at odds with the basic tenets of the Iraqi
nationalist insurgency, which alienated him from other groups in Iraq.
Zarqawi’s ideology was decidedly apocalyptic. He viewed his participation
in the Iraq insurgency as part of a cosmic battle between Muslims and
Byzantine Christians, and he sought to attack Shia Muslims in accordance
with Sunni apocalyptic prophecy. A coalition forces airstrike killed
Zarqawi on June 7, 2006. After Zarqawi’s death, AQI’s organizational
structure became more bureaucratic and institutionalized. The group
also demonstrated significantly fewer attacks after his death. The Global
Terrorism Database indicates AQI’s last terrorist attack was on September
25, 2011.39 After this time, AQI splintered with a significant portion
becoming the Islamic State in Iraq.
Soldiers of Heaven
The Soldiers of Heaven formed in Najaf, Iraq, in 1990. The group’s leader,
a messianic figure named Diya Abdul-Zahra Kadhim, wanted to create
mass violence to bring about the Hidden Imam consistent with Islamic
theology.40 Some reports suggest that Kadhim believed that he was the
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Hidden Imam.41 The cult remained obscure to residents of the Najaf area,
but residents noticed activity within the group increase after the 2003
Iraq invasion. Iraqi authorities eventually received information that the
group was planning an attack during the Shiite festival of Ashoura. On
January 29, 2007, Iraqi forces approached the group’s compound with
the intention of questioning or arresting members of the group. The Iraqi
force came under heavy attack when it neared the compound and called
for coalition support. The battle lasted for twenty-four hours and resulted
in the death of 350 members of the group.42

METHODS
This study used a comparative case analysis methodology. The
comparative case method is useful to draw inferences from case-based
material. The unit of analysis, or case, in this methodology is apocalyptic
group. There are eight cases in this analysis: People’s Temple, Branch
Davidians, Solar Temple, Aum Shinrikyo, Heaven’s Gate, Movement
Restoration, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Soldiers of Heaven. The cases inform
seven variables. The variables examined are Years Existing, Years to
Violence, Violence Precipitant, Violent Action, Total Deaths from First
Mass Violence Episode, Precipitant to Dissolution, End of Group.
This study used a purposive sampling method of case selection. Purposive
sampling is useful for selecting information-rich cases that allow
exploration of the phenomena under study and subsequent comparison
and contrast of the phenomena.43 Exploring books, journals, websites,
and search engines identified cases. The cases in this study had the
following characteristics: Apocalyptic thinking central to group; group
committed mass violence; group has terminated. The tendency for some
apocalyptic groups to linger rather than to dissolve prohibited them from
inclusion. For instance, the Israeli apocalyptic terrorist group Kach has not
committed a large-scale terrorist attack since 1994, but there is indication
that the group still exists.44 Since there is no reported end date for Kach, it
was not included in the case analysis.45
The cases selected for exploration were modern apocalyptic groups.
Modern apocalyptic groups are more likely to share cohort effects, so
the data they yield may be of greater benefit to hypotheses about other
contemporary apocalyptic groups. This study used explanation building
to analyze the data. Explanation building starts with observations and
creates an understanding of what is happening with the data and why.46
This study also used an interpretive approach to understand the motives
driving each case.47
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Coding
Years Existing is simply the amount of years the group has been active
from its beginning year to its ending year. Years to Violence is the
amount of time that transpired from the group’s beginning to its first
episode of mass violence. This study defines mass violence as the killing,
or attempted killing, of three or more people at one time. Violence
Precipitant is the event that stands in temporal relation to the mass
violence. Type of Violent Action is the characterization of the violence
that occurred. Number Deaths First Mass Violence is the number of
deaths that occurred during the group’s first episode of mass violence.
Precipitant Dissolution is the event that temporally preceded the group’s
dissolution. End of Group is the characterization of the group’s dissolution.
Table 1 examines these variables in relation to each group.

Table 1. Case Comparison Matrix.

CASE

YEARS
YEARS TO VIOLENCE
EXISTING VIOLENCE PRECIPITANT

FIRST
VIOLENT
PRECIPITANT
MASS
ACTION
DISSOLUTION
DEATH

END OF
GROUP

People’s
Temple

22

22

Psychological Affront

Murder-Suicide

909

Psychological Affront

Total
Dissolution

Branch
Davidian

15

15

Armed Confrontation

Murder-Suicide

80

Armed Confrontation

Total
Dissolution

Solar
Temple

11

8

Psychological Affront

Murder-Suicide

50

Psychological Affront

Drain of
Members

Aum
Shinrikyo

16

5

Psychological Affront

Murder

3

Legal Sanctions

Splinter

Heaven’s
Gate

22

22

Enactment of End Plan

Suicide

39

Enactment of End Plan

Total
Dissolution

Move
Restore

11

11

Psychological Affront

Murder

8

Psychological Affront

Total
Dissolution

AQI

7

0.7

Enactment of End Plan

Murder

11

Death of Key Leader

Splinter

Soldiers
Heaven

17

17

Armed Confrontation

Died Fighting

350

Armed Confrontation

Total
Dissolution

Source: Author.
One limitation to this study relates to a common weakness in the
comparative case analysis design—external validity. External validity
refers to the degree to which findings generalize to other cases. As
such, caution must be used when attempting to apply findings from the
cases examined in this study to less similar cases. For instance, activity
observed in mostly Western apocalyptic groups may not fully generalize
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to non-Western groups. Another limitation to the present study is
the issue of case selection. The cases examined in this article were
purposefully selected rather than randomly selected consistent with the
purposive sampling method.

RESULTS
This study examined eight cases. Some of the cases resembled each other
quite closely, while others appeared different. For example, many of the
groups had an inward orientation and focused on the intense relationship
between members of the group and the group leader. People’s Temple
and Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments resembled
each other in this manner. Other groups had more of an outward
orientation and those groups tended towards terrorist and insurgent
activity, such as Aum Shinrikyo, AQI, and Soldiers of Heaven.
Years in Existence
The average (mean) years in existence for the apocalyptic groups
examined in this article is 15.1 years. The shortest existence for an
apocalyptic group was AQI, which was 7 years. The longest groups in
existence were People’s Temple and Heaven’s Gate, both of which lasted
22 years. Table 2 displays the averages for all variables.

Table 2. Group Averages.

CASE

All Cases

YEARS
YEARS TO VIOLENCE
EXISTING VIOLENCE PRECIPITANT
15.1

12.5

Psychological Affront

FIRST
VIOLENT
PRECIPITANT
MASS
ACTION
DISSOLUTION
DEATH
MurderSuicide;
Murder

44.5

Psychological Affront

END OF
GROUP
Total
Dissolution

Source: Author.
Years to Mass Violence
The average (mean) years to violence for the groups examined in this
study were 12.5 years. The group that had the shortest amount of time
to mass violence was AQI, which was 0.7 years, and the groups with the
longest time to mass violence were People’s Temple and Heaven’s Gate,
both of which were 22 years.
Precipitant to Mass Violence
The most frequently occurring precipitant to violence for the groups
examined in this article was Psychological Affront (four groups).
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Psychological Affront represents a perception based, rather than
material, threat to the group or its leader. For example, People’s Temple
experienced a Psychological Affront when Representative Leo Ryan
visited its compound and publicly questioned the group and its leader.
This may have left the perception that the group lacked the omnipotence
that its leader proclaimed it to have. Furthermore, the test of the group
leader in such a public manner challenged his unquestioned authority.
The fact that a handful of group members sought to defect with the
Congressman was a further blow to the perceived omnipotence of the
group. Even though a handful of members sought to defect, this was not
a material loss to a group of nearly 1,000 people. The challenge to the
integrity of the group during this Psychological Affront may have been
sufficient to destabilize it and precipitate mass murder-suicide.
Other groups’ precipitant to mass violence was Armed Confrontation.
Armed Confrontation is a confrontation with the group or its leader where
some armed authority seeks to detain or attack the group or its leader.
Some groups’ precipitant to mass violence was Enactment of End Plan.
Enactment of End Plan occurred when the group’s actions followed its
main objectives. As such, the group simply behaved according to its
end-plan. Both Heaven’s Gate and AQI had this as a precipitant. Heaven’s
Gate’s mass suicide was consistent with its plan and AQI’s murderous
activity was consistent with AQI’s terrorist plans.
Type of Violent Action
The Type of Violent Action enacted by the apocalyptic groups examined
in this article was bifurcated. Murder (three groups) and Murder-Suicide
(three groups) occurred during the groups’ first episodes of mass
violence. The violent action for one group was strictly suicide and the
violent action for another group was death in battle.
Total Deaths from First Violent Episode
The average (median) number of total deaths from the first episode of
mass violence for the groups examined in this article was 44.5. The range
for total deaths at the groups’ first episodes was vast and ranged from
three to 909. This reflects the observation that for some apocalyptic
groups the whole group perished in the first mass violence episode.
Precipitant to Dissolution
The most frequently occurring Precipitant to Dissolution for the
apocalyptic groups examined in this article was Psychological Affront
(three groups). One hypothesis for this is that a perceived (as opposed
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to material) threat to the integrity of the group or its leader triggered
the downfall of these groups. For example, the failed prophecies of
Movement’s leader caused dissension and defection, and this threat to the
integrity of the leader and group stimulated mass violence in the form of
murder of the dissenters and then murder-suicide of the whole group.
Armed Confrontation was the Precipitant to Dissolution for two groups. In
these cases, Armed Confrontation triggered a final standoff that resulted
in the group’s downfall. Legal Sanctions was the Precipitant to Dissolution
for one group, which meant that the legal institutions stimulated the
group’s downfall. In this case, Japan created laws against Aum Shinrikyo
and conducted law enforcement operations against the group until it
splintered. Enactment of End Plan was the Precipitant to Dissolution
for one group. In this case, Heaven’s Gate began its plan for suicide
without an outside triggering event and executed the plan until the group
dissolved. Lastly, Death of Key Leader was the Precipitant to Dissolution
for one group. In this case, authorities killed Zarqawi and AQI began a
slow downfall that eventually resulted in its splintering.
End of Group
The most frequently occurring End of Group for the apocalyptic groups
examined in this article was Total Dissolution (five groups). As such, the
groups whose End of Group was Total Dissolution experienced a complete
termination of the group. In effect, the Precipitant to Dissolution led to
the end of these groups. Splintering was the End of Group for two groups,
which means that remnants of the group remained after the Precipitant
to Dissolution and eventually went to other groups. Lastly, the End of
Group for one group was Drain of Members. This End of Group is the slow
attrition of members until the group effectively dissolved. In this case,
Solar Temple became violent and enacted its suicidal mission. However,
the group dissolved in waves over the course of three years as members
continued to commit suicide consistent with the group’s plan.

PATTERNS
One pattern borne out of the data was that apocalyptic groups are
sensitive to Psychological Affront and may act violently in response to it.
Half of the apocalyptic groups examined in this study precipitated to mass
violence by Psychological Affront. The result of this can be significant
as the average number of deaths that occurred because of this type
of triggering event was 44.5. The targets of this type of violence were
within and outside of the groups. Evidence of Psychological Affront (for
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example, leader loss of credibility, defectors) may serve as an indicator of
potential catastrophic effects.
Another pattern displayed was that most of the apocalyptic groups
examined in this article (five groups) had their first mass violence episode
after their first decade of existence. In a sense, these groups seem to
operate according to the injunction “when the time is right” apocalyptic
activity will take place. For many groups, the disorganizing effects of a
Psychological Affront may have fed into the self-referencing tendencies
of the group and its leader leaving them with the sense that “the time has
come.” It is also likely that apocalyptic groups become more vulnerable
to Psychological Affront over the course of time as their prophecies
do not come true, the fallibility of the leader and group become more
apparent, and as people begin to experience a change in mind about the
group. Indeed, the psychosocial crises that tend to propel people toward
cults may well resolve after a decade, which leaves people interested
in developing a life outside of the group. This may result in a desire to
defect, which has been a major element of Psychological Affront. Over
half of the groups (five groups) precipitated to dissolution by some
confrontation, either psychological or armed.
Notable differences existed when comparing the apocalyptic groups
with a terrorist and insurgent orientation (Aum Shinrikyo, AQI, and
Soldiers of Heaven) with traditional cult apocalyptic groups (People’s
Temple, Branch Davidians, Solar Temple, Heaven’s Gate, and Movement
Restoration). Though the average number of years both types of groups
remained in existence was close (13.3 for terrorist-oriented groups and
16.2 for traditional groups), a notable difference existed in the time it took
the groups to engage in mass violence. The terrorist groups averaged
their first mass violence attack after 7.6 years, while the traditional cult
groups averaged their first attacks after 15.6 years. There was no clear
distinguishing precipitant to mass violence for the terrorist groups. This
contrasted with a clear precipitant to mass violence for the traditional
groups, which was Psychological Affront.
The type of violence from the terrorist groups was murder, while the type
of violence from the traditional groups was murder-suicide. Interestingly,
the average Total Deaths from the first episode of mass violence for the
terrorist groups (11) was much less than the average for the traditional
groups (50). There was no clear Precipitant to Dissolution for the terrorist
groups, while Psychological Affront was the common Precipitant to
Dissolution for the traditional groups. Two out of the three terrorist
groups’ end was Splintering, while four out of the five traditional groups’
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end was Total Dissolution. Table 3 displays a comparison between
terrorist orientation and traditional orientation.

Table 3. Comparison of Average Variables by Orientation.

CASE

YEARS
YEARS TO VIOLENCE
EXISTING VIOLENCE PRECIPITANT

FIRST
VIOLENT
PRECIPITANT
MASS
ACTION
DISSOLUTION
DEATH

END OF
GROUP

Terrorist
Apocalyptic

13.3

7.6

Psych; End
Plan; Armed

Murder

Traditional
Apocalyptic

16.2

15.6

Psychological
Affront

Murder-Suicide

11

Legal; Death
LDR; Armed

Splinter

50

Psychological
Affront

Total
Dissolution

Source: Author.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TERRORIST AND
TRADITIONAL GROUPS
Despite notable differences between the apocalyptic groups with a
terrorist orientation and those with a traditional orientation, several
similarities between the orientations existed. Of the two different
orientations, Branch Davidians and Soldiers of Heaven have the closest
resemblance to each other. The two groups had a Years Existing that
matched their Years to Violence, both had a Violence Precipitant of
Armed Confrontation, both had a Precipitant to Dissolution of Armed
Confrontation, and both had an End of Group of Total Dissolution.
Moreover, each group had a devoutly religious framework (one Islamic
and one Christian) with a leader who made messianic claims. Despite
these similarities, the groups’ orientations were vastly different as Soldiers
of Heaven planned offensive terrorist activities within the context of the
Iraq insurgency, while Branch Davidians maintained a defensive posture in
the United States.
Other similarities between the orientations existed too. Al Qaeda in Iraq
and Heaven’s Gate shared the same Violence Precipitant of Enactment of
End Plan, and in fact, were the only groups to have that as a precipitant.
This is especially notable considering that AQI was the most terroristic of
the groups and Heaven’s Gate was inwardly focused and appeared to be
the least coercive of the groups. Both groups appeared to execute their
mission absent any noticeable precipitant. Another similarity between
the orientations was evident between Aum Shinrikyo and the traditional
groups in that Aum Shinrikyo had a Violence Precipitant of Psychological
Affront, as did the traditional groups. These similarities suggest that
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despite real differences between the apocalyptic group orientations,
similar vulnerabilities may exist.

CONCLUSION
One hypothesis to emerge from this study is that traditional apocalyptic
groups become violent at the end of ten years. Traditional apocalyptic
groups seem to become more vulnerable to a perceived affront to the
group’s integrity or to the leader’s integrity around this time. As such,
routine questioning of a leader or the fostering of defections from the
group may precipitate catastrophic effects after ten years. An informed
diplomacy may be useful if law enforcement wants to investigate an
apocalyptic group after this period. Diplomacy in this manner may entail
having a credible intermediary foster a connection with the group in a way
that does not stimulate the group’s psychological vulnerabilities. This may
prevent a cascade of events that can result in mass murder-suicide if the
group perceives an imminent threat.
Another hypothesis to emerge from this study is the best time to
intervene before a terrorist apocalyptic group attempts a catastrophic
attack may be before the group’s seventh year. There is no clear
precipitant to a terrorist apocalyptic group’s mass violent attack.
The three terrorist apocalyptic groups examined in this study all
had independent precipitating events before they committed mass
violence. Similarly, this study found no recurring precipitants to terrorist
apocalyptic group dissolution. There was, however, consistency in the
way apocalyptic terrorist groups ended—splintering. Therefore, attempts
to interdict a terrorist apocalyptic group may result in splintering of its
members. The finding that apocalyptic terrorist groups end by splintering
is consistent with the findings of Seth Jones and Martin Libicki who
showed that the most common way religious terrorist groups (of which
apocalyptic terrorist groups are a subset) dissolve is by splintering.48
One can surmise that apocalyptic terrorist groups differed from
apocalyptic cults on many of the variables examined in this study because
of the difference in the groups’ orientations. Apocalyptic terrorist groups
have a different mission than apocalyptic cults, which helps explain some
of the group differences. Apocalyptic terrorist groups will seek mass
violence as an influence tactic that is not necessarily an indication of its
apocalyptic agenda being set in motion. For example, many of AQI’s
attacks were in furtherance of the Iraq insurgency and not meant to
instigate an apocalyptic confrontation, and Aum Shinrikyo disassociated
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some of its attacks from its larger apocalyptic agenda. This contrasts with
apocalyptic cults, where the precipitating event to their first mass violence
episode often resulted in catastrophic effects.
The dissimilarity in missions may result in a heterogeneous composition
of group members in apocalyptic terrorist groups when compared to
apocalyptic cults. Apocalyptic terrorist groups likely have a core of
true believers who operate according to the group’s apocalyptic vision.
However, it is possible that there are terrorist free riders who may be
less devoted to an apocalyptic vision and more interested in a terrorist
and insurgent agenda. Terrorist free riders will probably be less likely
to see provocations as an apocalyptic sign and they will likely engage
in terrorist actions that are disassociated from the group’s apocalyptic
vision. This heterogeneity of group composition shows in AQI, which had
an apocalyptic core but that recruited and employed secular terrorists.
The different group composition may also help explain the notable
differences in vulnerability to Psychological Affront between apocalyptic
terrorist groups and apocalyptic cults. The high vulnerability to
Psychological Affront seen in apocalyptic cults is likely a function of
the groups’ dependence on the charismatic leader and the perceived
omnipotence of the group. The closed society embraced by apocalyptic
cults leaves its members extremely dependent on the leader and the
group. Affronts sufficient to pierce through the distorted view held of the
leader and the group may disrupt the group homeostasis and precipitate
a crisis from within.
Future research of apocalyptic groups should examine the prevalence
of apocalyptic followers within the ranks of traditional religious terrorist
groups. Religious terrorist groups are not necessarily apocalyptic, but it
may be possible that traditional religious terrorist groups host several
followers who hold apocalyptic beliefs consistent with the groups
examined in this article. For example, how many followers does a Shia
terrorist group, such as Hezbollah, have that subscribe to the type of
apocalyptic beliefs held by the Shiite apocalyptic terrorist group Soldiers
of Heaven? Similarly, are there apocalyptic elements within al-Qaeda and
its affiliates that subscribe to Sunni apocalyptic beliefs as Zarqawi did with
AQI? Sizeable numbers of apocalyptic followers in these conventional
religious terrorist groups could be ready to see events as apocalyptic
signs, the herald of which might steer their actions away from their field
commanders’ directions and toward fulfilling an apocalyptic agenda.
Zarqawi and AQI often pursued their own agenda in this manner.
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Another area of future research should be on the apocalyptic group’s
charismatic leader. Questions to examine in the future are as follows:
Do charismatic leaders lose confidence in themselves as the apocalyptic
group progresses? Do charismatic leaders experience some form of
mental illness or addiction as the group progresses that make them
susceptible to catastrophic action? Is there a relationship between the
number of unfulfilled prophecies made by apocalyptic charismatic leaders
and the time it takes the group to dissolve? Answers to these questions
might help the security community better gauge their approach to
apocalyptic groups.
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